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First of all, let me convey my thanks that I have been given the opportunity to submit a 
revision of my manuscript. The revised submission titled “Overstepping unconscious 
boundaries: Folk beliefs on real world applications of psychological research on the 
unconscious” includes three online experimental studies. 
Below are the additional changes to the text in response to Reviewer 2’s comments, as 
Reviewer 1 has accepted the changes made to the previous revised manuscript in response 
their comments. All changes made to the revised manuscript in response to Reviewer 2’s 




Comment 1: The author now claims that examples are ecologically valid and volunteered 
from the participants themselves. This does not solve the issue originally raised however. 
The sample used to derive the examples (Exp1) was different from the samples used to 
test beliefs (Exp2/3). Thus, we still don’t know whether the critical participants from 
Exp2/3 have had experience with the examples or not. This needs to be stated more 
explicitly.
Response 1: First the claim regarding ecological validity was a revision in the text that 
was based on suggestions by Reviewer 2, for which I am extremely grateful as this helped 
with the way the details of the study was framed. 
The sample from which participants were drawn for Experiment 1 and 2 were the same, 
participants were sampled using the same methods, and from the same four countries (i.e. 
US, UK, Canada, Australia), Experiment 3 include a sample that was specific to the UK 
only. In Experiment 1 there was no differences in the pattern of responses as function of 
country, and when specific analyses were conducted on specific categories (e.g., 
marketing, politics etc.), while the Reviewer is obviously correct in pointing out that there 
were differences in the frequencies of participants volunteering examples associated with 
marketing, specifically by political affiliation, there were no differences as a function of 
country. 
The critical difference between Experiment 2 and 3 were that the experimental set up was 
different, and so the measures used in Experiment 2 and 3 tested for the way in which 
participants made judgments about the unconscious, free will, conscious control and 
conscious intentions with respect to the categories of examples that were derived from 
Experiment 1. What the study can’t say is whether the sample of participants in 
Experiment 2 and 3 would volunteer the same range of examples as those generated in 
Experiment 1. But the aim of Experiment 2 and 3 were different anyway, because the aim 
for these experiments was to determine, given the examples generated from Experiment 
1, what kinds of judgments participants made with respect to the four dimensions that 
they were presented. 
The Reviewer is of course right that we don’t know whether the critical participants from 
Exp2/3 have had direct experience with the examples or not, and this was not a question 
that was asked in Experiment 2 and 3. What both these experiments suggest is that, given 
that the examples they were presented with, age, gender, education, political affiliation, 
and religiosity (see Page 25) did not predict the variance in responses to each of the four 
judgment probes. And, in Experiment 1, neither age, gender, education and political 
affiliation predict the proportion of examples generated by each category. 
Nevertheless, to reflect the point proposed by Reviewer 2, a statement on this is included 
in the general discussion in the “limitations and future considerations” section. 
The additional text is “Finally, the sample of participants in Experiment 1 were asked to 
volunteer examples of situations for which they believed that had experienced day to day 
situation of the application of psychological research on the unconscious control of 
behaviours. There is of course no way to determine from the current study whether 
participants sampled in Experiment 2 and 3 had the same experiences as those that were 
generated by those in Experiment 1. Those in Experiment 2 and 3 were presented with a 
revised set of examples, with some minor edits, from which they were asked to make 
several judgments, for which the regression analyses revealed that age, gender, 
education, political affiliation and religiosity did not significantly predict variance in 
responses. However, in addition to this, in retrospect an additional measurement probe 
that could have been included in these experiments was one that asked the extent to which 
participants had direct experience with the scenarios that they were presented. This way 
it would be possible to assess the extent to which direct experience with the scenarios 
impacted the judgments but also to determine the extent to which the samples in 
Experiment 2 and 3 were similar in their general folk beliefs to those sample in 
Experiment 1. A future replication and extension of this study that included a question of 
the kind proposed here would help to address this potential issue.”. 
Comment 2: The author mainly reports r2 values in the results sections. Please also 
provide an index containing directional information (e.g. beta estimates), to more clearly 
support claims of positive/negative relationships between specific variables.
Response 2: This has been done. The inclusion of beta estimates in the presentation of 
correlations is now included. 
Highlights
 There is strong convergence of folk beliefs on the unconscious in natural examples
 Marketing is the most frequent example of the use of research on the unconscious
 Folk beliefs of constructs associated with the unconscious are context dependent
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Experiment 3 (N =100). Participants rated the extent to which the behaviour being influenced 
in these contexts was: 1) via the unconscious, 2) free, 3) the result of prior conscious intentions, 
4) under conscious control. Relative to judgements about the extent to which behaviour was 
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28 There are numerous ways in which psychologists and neuroscientists have characterised the 
29 properties consciousness (e.g., Gangopadhyay, Madary, & Spicer, 2010; Kihlstrom, 2009; 
30 Melnikoff, & Bargh, 2018; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Pennartz, 2018; Shea, & Frith, 2016). 
31 However, in the broadest of terms, consciousness can be conceived of relating to matters 
32 regarding awareness (e.g., of ourselves, of our social and physical environment), and control 
33 (e.g., of perceptual-motor activities, of our social and physical environment). The focus of the 
34 present study is to investigate folk beliefs on applications of psychological research on the 
35 unconscious control of behaviours
36
37 Do people share similar beliefs regarding the ways in which psychological research on the 
38 unconscious has been utilised beyond the academic world (e.g., advertising, government, 
39 clinical practice)?. Which are the most commonly held beliefs? Moreover, if unconscious 
40 control of behaviours is perceived to be used to influence behaviours in the real world, what 
41 type of folk beliefs are there regarding the extent to which conscious choice and free-will are 
42 maintained? To date, there has been no empirical work designed to answer these questions. 
43 Therefore, the aim of this study, which includes three experiments, is to empirical answer these 
44 questions. 
45
46 Folk beliefs on the unconscious and free will. As mentioned, while there is little work 
47 investigating the general views people hold regarding the application of psychological research 
48 on the unconscious in daily life, there is work examining people’s beliefs on the unconscious, 
49 and more often their views on the relationship that this has to free will. For instance, Monroe 
50 and Malle (2010) presented people with the question “Please explain in a few lines what you 
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51 think it means to have free will?”, the responses of their student population were coded into 
52 three categories: (a) decision or choice; (b) following one’s desires; and (c) overcoming 
53 (internal or external) constraints. The majority of participants volunteered responses falling 
54 under the category of ‘decision or choice’ (65%), with another 33% of responses classified 
55 under the option ‘following one’s desires’, and 29% providing responses under the category of 
56 overcoming external or internal constraints’. The findings suggest some overall agreement in 
57 the belief that making a deliberate choice is a demonstration of having free will. 
58
59 To further explore this, and to consider the role of determinism which was not a concept 
60 explicitly referred to by participants in their first study, Monroe and Malle (2010) followed up 
61 their study by presenting participants with the following statement “Neuroscientists claim that 
62 free will is a false impression; that all of our behaviour is caused by our neural impulses; and 
63 that any feelings of controlling our actions are an illusion.” Participants were then asked, “Does 
64 this sound believable to you?” and if they disagreed, they were asked to give an argument 
65 against the claim. 49% of respondents rejected the claim posed to them, and when it came to 
66 rejoinders to the claim, 55% gave responses that referred to having personal choice regardless 
67 of the fact that neural impulses may be the underlying basis of behaviour. These, and other 
68 findings examining folk beliefs on the unconscious and its association with free will show that 
69 the preservation of choice is a strong indicator of conscious behaviour, and a critical indicator 
70 of the presence of free will (e.g., Forstmann, & Burgmer, 2018; Malle, 2004; Malle & Knobe, 
71 1997; Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011). This also supports theoretical and empirical work 
72 suggesting the strong association that people make between conscious choice, and their sense 
73 of personal agency and control (Osman, 2010, 2014). Moreover, the findings examining folk 
74 beliefs regarding free will and consciousness also tend to suggest that people maintain a more 
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75 complex view of the relationship between the causal efficacy of their conscious choices, which 
76 in turn is used as a proxy for free will (Osman, 2014).
77
78 In other work exploring the association between folk beliefs on the unconscious and free 
79 choice, Shepherd’s (2012) study finds general support for the view that people judge an agent 
80 to have acted freely when presented with descriptions in which consciousness plays a central 
81 causal role in an agent’s behaviour. In addition, when consciousness does not play a central 
82 causal role in an agent’s behaviour, people tend to judge that the agent did not act freely. Here 
83 the evidence suggests that people generally have nuanced beliefs about the central causal 
84 relation between consciousness and free choice (Shepard, 2012; Stillman et al, 2011). In 
85 Stillman et al’s (2011) study, half of their participants were asked to volunteer examples that 
86 refer to experiences in their life in which they took an action they considered to be of their own 
87 free will. These were coded along several dimensions that included, positive outcomes, goal-
88 attainment, level of consciousness, moral behaviour, acting against external forces, long-term 
89 self-interest and short-term self-interest. The study was able to show that general folk beliefs 
90 around acting freely relate to experiences of conscious reflection that occurs prior to an action 
91 taking place. It is worth noting that the study had independent researchers classify and rate the 
92 examples according to different psychological constructs. However, it did not report details 
93 about what the actual contexts were, or asked other participants to assess the volunteered 
94 contexts according to their judgments and beliefs, instead; this would provide some insights 
95 into general folk beliefs regarding experiences where volition is judged to be commonly present 
96 and where it is absent. 
97
98 Further work by Deutschländer, Pauen, and Haynes (2017) examined the way in which folk 
99 beliefs impact the interpretation of daily events in relation to consciousness (in the presence of 
Overstepping the boundaries of free choice
6
100 a free action rather than determined by automatic or habitual processes), intention (the presence 
101 or absence of conscious intention prior to the action being performed), and whether or not the 
102 action is biologically driven (e.g. drinking because one is thirsty) or self-directed (e.g., picking 
103 up a book to read). Participants were presented with 12 different scenarios of simple 
104 descriptions of daily actions taken (drinking water, reading a book) in which 3 different 
105 dimensions were varied (i.e. consciousness, intentions, biological determined actions), and 
106 were asked to rate each scenario on the basis of ‘‘How free was the presented action?” (on a 
107 scale from 1 = not free to 5 = free) and their confidence in their rating. Deutschländer et al 
108 (2017) found that, a combination of prior intention to act, along with being free to act explained 
109 the majority of ratings regarding the extent to which the scenarios demonstrated a free action. 
110
111 The reviewed work on folk beliefs reveals a close relationship between consciousness and 
112 deliberation taking place prior to acting, particularly when early intentions are formed prior to 
113 what is judged by people to be a free choice. Furthermore, this work suggests that making 
114 conscious decisions is directly related to beliefs about free choice, and that by extension in the 
115 absence of making deliberate choices, people believe that they are less free (Vonasch, 
116 Baumeister, & Mele, 2018). However, much of the work in the domain of examining folk 
117 beliefs tends to involve participants responding to constructed realistic scenarios 
118 (Deutschländer et al, 2017; Feltz, 2015; Forstmann, & Burgmer, 2018; Malle & Knobe, 1997; 
119 Shepherd, 2012), but few are actually drawn from the participants’ own experiences (Monroe 
120 & Malle, 2010; Stillman et al’s (2011). Therefore, the present study is motivated to further 
121 explore people’s lay beliefs on free will and determinism, by using ecologically valid examples 
122 volunteered from the participants themselves.   
123
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124 Thus, to establish the generalisability of the pattern findings and to examine the range of actual 
125 examples participants volunteer, which has also attracted little empirical attention, the present 
126 study aims to address both. In particular, the present study examines the degree of convergence 
127 of folk psychological beliefs of the unconscious and related constructs across people, when 
128 they are presented with natural examples (by which is meant the examples that are freely 
129 volunteered based on personal beliefs and experiences). In addition, it is worth noting that, 
130 while Stillman et al. (2011) asked people to volunteer examples of instances in which they had 
131 no free choice, they and others have yet to investigated the extent to which the relationship 
132 between free will, conscious intentions, conscious control and the unconscious are associated 
133 when people don’t have free choice. This matters to the extent that it is possible to show that 
134 the direction of the relationship between these four constructs is sensitive to the context in 
135 which people are perceived to be acting freely or not, based on natural examples. 
136
137 For instance, there is a large body of psychology research that examines the role of the 
138 unconscious on behaviour (e.g., priming studies), which has had many applications in the real 
139 world (e.g., advertising) (e.g., Bargh, 2002; Dijksterhuis et al, 2005; Martin, & Morich, 2011; 
140 Yoo, Peña, & Drumwright, 2015). Similarly, there is an amassing literature on the use of 
141 behavioural interventions, such as nudges – decision-support techniques, designed to direct 
142 people to make better lifestyle choices for themselves around their health, finances and 
143 wellbeing (e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, 200; Sunstein 2017). These methods often, though not 
144 exclusively, rely on purported indirect methods of persuasion, such as presenting artwork on 
145 stairwells to encourage people to use the stairs instead of elevators (e.g. (Åvitsland, Solbraa, & 
146 Riiser, 2017; Kerr, Eves, & Carroll, 2001; Marshall et al., 2002), or the use default options, 
147 such as opt-in investment and pension funds (e.g., Benartzi et al., 2017). There has been 
148 considerable discussion on whether these methods are ethical assuming that they do change 
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149 people’s behaviour without them being aware of the basis for that change (for review see - Lin, 
150 Ashcroft, Osman, 2018; Osman, Lin, Ashcroft, 2018). Examples of this kind suggest that, if 
151 information critical to making choices in the real world is presented in a way that people are 
152 not conscious of, then they are likely to be making choices that are not under their conscious 
153 control, and therefore, not construed as free.  However, thus far, there is no empirical work that 
154 examines peoples’ folk beliefs regarding the applications of psychological research on the 
155 unconscious control of behaviours in typical experiences in daily life, and so the aim of this 
156 study is to explore this. 
157
158 Present study: Experiment 1 was an exploratory study that presented people with a single open 
159 ended question in which participants were asked to describe a typical context in which they 
160 thought that psychological research on the unconscious had been used to manipulate people's 
161 choices. The most common categories generated from Experiment 1 were used to form a set of 
162 naturalist examples in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2 participants rated the examples according 
163 to psychological properties that have been previously studied in the context of folk beliefs on 
164 conscious choice and free will (Deutschländer et al, 2017; Malle, 2004; Malle & Knobe, 1997; 
165 Stillman, et al, 2011), and Experiment 3 served as a replication of Experiment 2.
166
167 Experiment 1: Exploratory Study
168 Methods
169 Design: Experiment 1 was an exploratory study with a single independent variable, which was 
170 the country in which the samples were randomly drawn. There were four countries in total, 
171 each of which were English speaking (i.e. Australia, Canada, UK, US). There were two sets of 
172 dependent variables, the first was four demographic questions (i.e. Age, Gender, Education 
173 level, Political affiliation) and second main experimental question which was to volunteer a 
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174 typical example of a context in which participant thought psychological research on the 
175 unconscious had been used to influence behaviour.
176
177 Participants: Experiment 1 included a total of 399 participants, US (Total N = 99), UK samples 
178 (Total N = 100), Canadian (Total N = 104), and Australian (Total N = 96), (see Table 1). The 
179 experiment was presented via Qualtrics which is an online platform for running experiments, 
180 and launched via Prolific Academic - a crowd sourcing system for participant recruitment 
181 worldwide. All participants were financially compensated for their time (60 cents). The 
182 experiment gained ethics approval from Queen Mary University of London (QMUL) college 
183 ethics board, QMERC2018/54. Participants were first given 1 probative question regarding the 
184 influence of the unconscious on organisation and presented with 4 demographic questions (the 
185 responses to which are summarised in Table 1).
186
187 Insert Table 1 about here
188 Procedure: After consenting to take part in the experiment, all participants were provided with 
189 general instructions regarding the nature of the study  “…, in psychology the unconscious is 
190 taken to mean many things. The simplest description is that the unconscious is a type of process 
191 that influences what we do (thoughts, feelings, behaviours, attitudes, beliefs, judgments) in 
192 some way without us being consciously aware of HOW it influences what we do. That is, there 
193 is something that is guiding what we are doing at the back of our minds, but we can't easily 
194 explain what it is, and how it might be doing that. In the space provided below, all you need to 
195 do is describe a TYPICAL context, it could be any context, in which you tend to think that 
196 psychological research on the unconscious has been used in some way to manipulate 
197 behaviour. This question is left deliberately open so that you can answer in whichever way you 
198 think captures a typical experience in which you think the unconscious was influenced in some 
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199 way that would in turn have changed your behaviour. There is no right or wrong answer, and 
200 the answers that you will provide will be extremely informative.” Participants were provided a 
201 text box to enter their answers as an open ended response to the question.  Once participants 
202 had responded to this main question, they were presented with 4 demographic questions that 
203 asked about their age, gender, education level, and political affiliation, after which the 
204 experiment was complete. Participants were asked to fill in a text box to indicate their age, they 
205 were asked to select from four response options (female, male, other, prefer not to say) when 
206 indicating their gender, and for educational level they were required to fill in a text box to 
207 indicate their highest level of education, and to do the same to indicate their political affiliation.  
208
209 Coding of open ended responses: The full response set of all open ended responses can be 
210 found on in the supplementary materials. The method of coding the responses was as follows. 
211 After reading through all the responses, three independent coders generated categories that they 
212 identified as the most common from the entire set of 399 responses. The categories generated 
213 by each of the three coders is presented in Table 2. As can be seen from Table 2, many of the 
214 categories that were generated were similar, though the coders varied in the number of 
215 categories that they generated, (Coder 1 = 9, Coder 2 = 11, Coder 3 = 11). 
216
217 From the categories generated, the coders were presented with each other’s list, and when asked 
218 to generated a complete set of categories that took into account the other identified categories, 
219 a consensus was reached on the final set of 5 categories: Marketing (inclusive of sale, 
220 advertising, marketing), Research (inclusive of psychology, medical research, and other 
221 sciences that were referred to), Therapy (inclusive of hypnotherapy, clinical psychology), 
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222 Political (inclusive of political campaigns, government, Nudge1), Media (inclusive of social 
223 media, TV, films). The same three independent coders where then required to apply the 5 
224 agreed categories to the complete set of 399 responses. While coding the complete set three 
225 additional categories were generated (Don’t know, None, Other): these accounted for 
226 responses in which the responded had answered “Don’t know”, responses in which respondents 
227 had answered that there were no applications of psychological research that influence 
228 behaviour in any context – ‘None’, and finally responses that included contexts (e.g., dating, 
229 casinos, walking around parks, police tactics) which were infrequently referred and did not 
230 directly fit into the 5 main categories identified by the coders – ‘Other’. 
231 Insert Table 2 about here
232 Results
233 Inter-rater reliability: In order to establish inter-rater reliability several tests were 
234 implemented. First a correlational analysis was conducted. A Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
235 was applied to the ratings of Coder 1 and Coder 2 revealing, r2(399) = .928 (high correlation), 
236 p = .000006, Coder 1 and Coder 3 revealing, r2(399) = .896 (high correlation), p = .00003, and 
237 Coder 2 and Coder 3 revealing, r2(399) = .823 (high correlation), p = .00002. Each analysis 
238 suggested a high correlation between ratings between each coder. Second, the proportion of 
239 disagreement between at least 2 coders for each of the 8 categories was coded was examined 
240 (See Table 3). There were no categories in which responses were coded entirely differently by 
241 each coder, therefore, the final responses set was based on responses that were classified 
242 according the agreement of at least two coders, and of course by all three coders. The raw 
243 frequencies were entered into a chi-squared analysis to determine if there were any differences 
1 Nudge refers to a programme of regulatory tools that governments currently use based on behavioural insights 
to develop soft interventions designed to shape the way people make decisions (e.g., the use of defaults such as 
Opt-Out organ donation registers that default people into donating, and if they do not wish to donate, they can 
opt-out (for details see Lin, Osman, Harris, & Read, 2018)).
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244 in agreement/disagreement (coded as 1 =agreement, 2 disagreement). The analysis revealed 
245 that there was no overall significant difference in the amount based on coding of the responses 
246 to the 8 categories, Chi-squared (7) = 11.69, N =399, p = .11, though it should be noted that 
247 there was an expected count of less than 5 for some of the categories. On this basis, a second 
248 analysis was conducted omitting the three categories in which there were 0 disagreement (See 
249 Table 3). An analysis was performed looking at the overall level of agreement in coded 
250 responses to disagreement, Chi-squared (1) = 177.31, N =361, p = .0001, the analysis revealed 
251 that there was significantly more agreement in the way responses were coded than 
252 disagreement. Based on these analyses, the remainder of the results section is based on the 
253 responses coded with the most agreement between coders. 
254 Insert Table 3 about here
255 Responses by Country: The proportion of responses that fell into each category for each country 
256 are presented in Table 4. The raw frequencies were entered into a chi-squared analysis to 
257 determine if there were any differences in the pattern of responses by country. The analysis 
258 revealed that there was no significant difference between countries based on their responses to 
259 the categories, Chi-squared (21) = 26.65, N =399, p = .18.
260 Insert Table 4 about here
261 Responses by Gender: Collapsed across country, these analyses looked at whether there were 
262 gender differences by responses.  For ease of analysis only responses of those identifying 
263 themselves as male or female were included. The analysis revealed that there was no significant 
264 difference between genders based on their responses to the categories, Chi-squared (7) = 3.62, 
265 N = 395, p = .82. Responses by Age: Collapsed across country, these analyses looked at whether 
266 there were age differences by responses.  To conduct this analysis respondents were categorised 
267 into two age groups based on a media split of age (median = 28) (18-28, 29-80). The analysis 
268 revealed that there was no significant difference in responses to the categories based on age, 
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269 Chi-squared (7) = 7.27, N = 399, p = .40. Responses by political affiliation: Collapsed across 
270 country, these analyses looked at the impact of political affiliation on responses. Then 
271 responses were re-classified according to participants’ self-identification of political affiliation 
272 into three categories into Liberal, Centre, and Conservative; responses reported as ‘unsure’ 
273 were excluded. The analysis revealed that there was no significant difference in responses to 
274 the categories based on political affiliation, Chi-squared (7) = 17.09, N = 345, p = .25. 
275 Responses by education level: Collapsed across country, these analyses looked at the impact of 
276 by education level on responses. Participants responses were re-classified according to those 
277 that had a Bachelor’s degree or higher level of classification and those without obtaining a 
278 higher education degree. The analysis revealed that there was no significant difference in 
279 responses to the categories by educational level, Chi-squared (7) = 5.19, N = 399, p = .63.
280
281 Response by Category: Given that there were no differences by country, responses were 
282 collapsed across responses to look at whether the responses differed by category. All 8 
283 categories were included in the analysis. The analysis revealed that there was a significant 
284 difference in the frequencies of responses by category, Chi-squared (7) = 488.76, N =399, p = 
285 .00002. Looking at Table 4, across all participants, the most common response was Marketing, 
286 which accounted for approximately 45% of the responses, with the next most common response 
287 being Research which accounted for approximately 18% of the responses, and Other, which 
288 also accounted for 18% of the responses. Responses under the Marketing category: Given that 
289 Marketing made up close to half of the responses that participants volunteered, these were 
290 further analysed by country, age, gender, education and political affiliation. A chi-squared 
291 analysis did not reveal any difference in the number of respondents volunteering examples by 
292 country, Chi-squared (3) = .57, N =180, p = .90. When conducting binomial tests on gender, 
293 significantly more men (N = 106) than women (N = 72) volunteered examples that fell under 
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294 this category (p = .01). The same test was performed on age, and no significant difference was 
295 found by age (using the median split) (18-28, N = 90; 29-80, N = 90), and no significant 
296 difference by level of education (Bachelors and above = 90, Other = 90). A chi-squared analysis 
297 revealed a difference in the number of respondents by political affiliation (including only 
298 categories Liberal = 91, Centre = 44, Conservative = 16), Chi-squared (2) = 57.07, N =151, p 
299 = .0001. For those referring to advertising (n=106) as an example which fell under the category 
300 of Marketing, 45% referred to the term subliminal or associated terms involving reference to 
301 manipulation of the perceptions in the absence of peoples’ awareness. 
302
303 Experiment 1 Discussion
304 Experiment 1 revealed that at generally demographical and sample factors didn’t play a major 
305 role overall in the types of examples generated by participants, though gender and political 
306 affiliation played a role for a sub-category (i.e. marketing) of examples that were generated. 
307 More specifically, participants with a liberal leaning political affiliation were more likely to 
308 generate responses in the marketing category compared to those with a centre, or more 
309 conservative leaning political affiliation. Also, more men than women generated examples that 
310 fell into this category. Without any a priori hypotheses, it is difficult to speculate on why these 
311 particular demographic factors generated differences in the frequency of examples generated 
312 in this category. 
313
314 Given that general questions posed in this study that it aims to answer, the findings from 
315 Experiment 1 indicate that, with exception of one subcategory, there is general convergence 
316 across samples from different countries as to the examples they volunteer when it comes to 
317 thinking about common applications of psychological research on the unconscious control of 
318 behaviours. Also, in answer to the second which, which examples are most common, it appears 
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319 that marketing is the category to which the most frequent examples belong. In order to answer 
320 the third question posed in this study, which is the extent to which people judge they have free 
321 will in category of examples volunteered by participants, Experiment 2 was designed around 
322 the ecologically valid materials from Experiment 1. 
323
324 Experiment 2: Ratings tasks probing folk beliefs 
325 The aim of Experiment 2 was to further explore folk beliefs on the applications of 
326 psychological research on the unconscious control of behaviours, and to connect this to prior 
327 work examining people’s folk psychological beliefs on the unconscious and free will. Previous 
328 studies have shown that people’s folk beliefs on the unconscious are closely connected to free 
329 will, conscious intentions, and control (Deutschländer et al, 2017; Malle, 2004; Malle & 
330 Knobe, 1997; Stillman, et al, 2011). Therefore, to build on this work, the aim of Experiment 2 
331 was to determine, based on an entirely natural set of materials, if, in the presented examples, 
332 the direction of judgments would be as follows: The higher the ratings of unconscious influence 
333 the lower the ratings of free will, and conscious control.
334
335 Methods
336 Participants: The experiment included a total of 198 participants, US (Total N = 48), UK 
337 samples (Total N = 52), Canadian (Total N = 49), and Australian (Total N = 49), (see Table 2). 
338 The experiment was presented via Qualtrics using the same crowd sourcing system as 
339 Experiment 1. All participants were financially compensated for their time (90 cents). 
340 Participants were presented with 5 demographic questions (the responses to which are 
341 summarised in Table 5), and 4 ratings for each of the 16 examples drawn from volunteered 
342 context described by participants in Experiment 1.
343
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344 Design: Experiment 2 also had a single independent variable, which was the country in which 
345 the samples were randomly drawn from. These were the same four countries as in Experiment 
346 1 (i.e. UK, Canada, US, Australia). There were two sets of dependent variables, the first was 
347 five demographic questions (i.e. Age, Gender, Education level, Political affiliation, Religiosity) 
348 and the second set was the four ratings for each of the 16 examples drawn from those generated 
349 in Experiment 1. The presentation of each example was randomised for each participant, along 
350 with the ordering of each of the four rating questions presented for each example. 
351 Insert Table 5 about here.
352 Materials: The criteria for generating the examples used in Experiment 2 were the following:  
353 1) the examples were drawn exclusively from the 5 main categories revealed in Experiment 1, 
354 2) the examples were more than 10 words long, and less than 50 words long; 3) they identified 
355 a single context in which the unconscious was thought to influence behaviour; 4) there was no 
356 overt or highly personalised opinions about whether or not the application of psychological 
357 research on the unconscious in the context described was good or bad; 5) there were no 
358 personalised references to subjective experiences of the application of psychological research 
359 on the unconscious in contexts that they had felt had influenced their behaviour; 6) there were 
360 no explicit references to named brands, companies, firms; 7) there were no explicit references 
361 to technical terminology (e.g., nudge, implicit attitude tests, automatic association). Following 
362 the application of these 7 criteria to the 384 examples from Experiment 1 (excluding, NO and 
363 Don’t know responses), a total of 96 met the criteria, from which 16 were selected (see Table 
364 6). 
365 Insert Table 6 about here
366 To get to the final agreed 16 examples, the raters applied the following additional criteria to 
367 the 96 screened examples: 1) the examples has to be simple and easy to understand; 2) the 
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368 details has to be specific enough to identify the context and the targeted behaviour, 3) the 
369 descriptions had to be neutral.
370
371 The four main dependent measures used to assess judgments of the 16 examples were as 
372 follows, each of with a response scale ranging from 0 = not at all to 10 = completely. Rating of 
373 the Unconscious: To what extent do you think that [reference to method of influence] influences 
374 [reference to behaviour] unconsciously? Ratings of Free Will: To what extent do you think that 
375 [reference to the behaviour] under the influence [reference to method of influence] is the result 
376 of free choice? Ratings of Conscious intentions: To what extent do you think that [reference to 
377 the behaviour] under the influence [reference to method of influence] is the result of conscious 
378 intentions formed before [reference to behaviour]? Ratings of Conscious Control: To what 
379 extent do you think that [reference to the behaviour] under the influence [reference to method 
380 of influence] is under conscious control?
381
382 Procedure: The same procedure in Experiment 1 was used in Experiment 2, with the following 
383 differences. Participants were given instructions regarding the fact that they would have 16 
384 examples to think about and for each example, they were make a rating on four different 
385 dimensions (Ratings of the Unconscious, Ratings of Free Will, Ratings of Conscious intentions, 
386 Ratings of Conscious Control), and that when they had completed all four ratings for each of 
387 the 16 examples, and provided their demographic details (these were presented in the same 
388 way as Experiment 1, but for the inclusion of religiosity, for which participants were asked to 
389 type in a text box provided if they identified with a particular belief system, otherwise if they 
390 preferred not to say, they were simply asked to type an ‘X’ in the free text box), the experiment 
391 would be complete. 
392
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393 Results
394 Comparison by country: The ratings for each of the four dependent variables (Ratings of the 
395 Unconscious, Ratings of Free Will, Ratings of Conscious intentions, Ratings of Conscious 
396 Control) were each collapsed across the 16 different scenarios, so that an overall mean rating 
397 was calculated for each of the four dependent variables. From this, a Univariate analysis of 
398 variance was performed on each of the dependent variables to determine the extent to which 
399 ratings differed by country (See Figure 1). The analyses revealed that for each of the ratings 
400 there were no differences by country; Ratings of the Unconscious, F(1,194) = .26, p = .86, 
401 partial eta = .004; Ratings of Free Will F(1,194) = .58, p = .62, partial eta = .01; Ratings of 
402 Conscious Intentions F(1,194) = 1.34, p = .26, partial eta = .02; Ratings of Conscious Control, 
403 F(1,194) = .46, p = .71, partial eta = .007.
404 Insert Figure 1 about here.
405 Relationship between the four ratings: A one-tailed Pearson’s correlation was conducted, to 
406 examine the extent to which the following predicted pattern was detected: There should be a 
407 negative relationship between ratings of unconscious and the other three ratings (i.e. free will, 
408 prior conscious intentions, conscious control). The analyses did not confirm this prediction. 
409 They revealed a positive correlation between ratings of Free Will and ratings of Conscious 
410 Intentions r2(198) = .43 (moderate correlation), (β = .29), p < .00005, as well a positive 
411 correlation between ratings of Free Will and ratings of Conscious Control r2(198) = .45 
412 (moderate correlation), (β = .31), p < .00005. Ratings of Conscious Intentions were also 
413 positively correlated with ratings of Conscious Control, r2(198) = .47 (moderate correlation), 
414 (β = .36), p < .00005. No other correlational analyses were found to be significant, suggesting 
415 that overall, there was no relationship between ratings of the Unconscious and Free will, 
416 Conscious Intentions, and Conscious control, but a positive relationship with the remaining 
417 three ratings. 
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418 Differences in mean ratings by context: The mean ratings were calculated separately for each 
419 context (e.g., mean rating of the Unconscious for the context ‘marketing’ were based on 
420 averaging across the 5 different examples for that context). Then each dependent variable was 
421 subjected to an analysis of variance. When comparing the 5 different contexts (Marketing, 
422 Research, Therapy, Political, Media) on ratings of the Unconscious, a repeated ANOVA, with 
423 country as the between subject factor, did not reveal a significant main effect of context, 
424 F(1,194) = 3.15, p = .07, partial eta = .02; no significant main effect of country was found and 
425 no interaction effects. The same analysis performed on ratings of Free Will revealed a main 
426 effect of context, F(1,194) = 9.10, p < .005, partial eta = .05, as was the case with ratings of 
427 Conscious Intentions, F(1,194) = 22.69, p < .0005, partial eta = .11, and ratings of Conscious 
428 Control, F(1,194) = 23.74, p < .0005, partial eta = .11. In each case, there was no significant 
429 main effect of country, and no interaction effects. The indication here is that the context 
430 impacted the pattern of ratings of Free Will, Conscious Intentions, and Conscious Control but 
431 not ratings of the Unconscious. To examine these patterns more closely the remaining analysis 
432 considers each of the ratings in each context individually. 
433
434 Ratings in Marketing Contexts: The ratings for each of the four dependent variables (Ratings 
435 of the Unconscious, Ratings of Free Will, Ratings of Conscious Intentions, Ratings of 
436 Conscious Control) were collapsed across the 5 different marketing scenarios and averaged, 
437 (See Figure 2). Paired sample t-tests were conducted. The analyses revealed that when 
438 compared against ratings of the Unconscious, ratings of Free Will were significantly higher (M 
439 = -.43, SD = 2.36, N = 198), t(197) = 2.55, p =.01, BF = .72), as were ratings of Conscious 
440 Control (M = 1.30, SD = 2.51, N = 198), t(197) = 7.29, p < .00005, BF10 = 0.18), but no 
441 significant difference was found when compared with ratings of Conscious Intentions (M = -
442 .11, SD = 2.49, N = 198), t(197) = .61, p = .54, BF = 14.73). Thus, in the context of marketing, 
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443 average ratings of the Unconscious were significantly higher than Free Will and Conscious 
444 Control. 
445 Insert Figure 2 about here.
446
447 Ratings in Research Contexts: When it came to the overall mean ratings under the context 
448 “Research” (see Figure 2), the analyses revealed that when compared against ratings of the 
449 Unconscious, ratings of Free Will were significantly lower (M = 1.76, SD = 2.71, N = 198), 
450 t(197) = 9.12, p < .000005, BF14 = 1.85), as were ratings of Conscious Intentions (M = 1.77, 
451 SD = 2.68, N = 198), t(197) = 9.32, p < .000005, BF15 = 5.13), and ratings of Conscious Control 
452 (M = 1.88, SD = 2.72, N = 198), t(197) = 9.73, p < .000005, BF16 = 3.53). Thus, in the context 
453 of research, average ratings of the Unconscious were significantly higher than Free Will, 
454 Conscious Intentions and Conscious Control.
455
456 Ratings in Therapy Contexts: The overall mean ratings for each of the four dependent variables 
457 were analysed (see Figure 2). Comparing against ratings of the Unconscious, ratings of Free 
458 Will were significantly lower (M = 2.14, SD = 3.86, N = 198), t(197) = 7.82, p < .000005, BF11 
459 = 5.55), as were ratings of Conscious Intentions (M = 1.90, SD = 4.10, N = 198), t(197) = 6.54, 
460 p < .000005, BF8 = 7.60), and ratings of Conscious Control (M = 2.24, SD = 4.09, N = 198), 
461 t(197) = 7.70, p < .00005, BF10 = 1.12). Thus, in the context of therapy, average ratings of the 
462 Unconscious were significantly higher than Free Will, Conscious Intentions and Conscious 
463 Control. 
464
465 Ratings in Political Contexts: The mean ratings for each of the four dependent variables across 
466 the 2 different political examples were analysed (see Figure 2). Comparing against ratings of 
467 the Unconscious, ratings of Free Will were significantly higher (M = -1.22, SD = 3.16, N = 
468 198), t(197) = 5.45, p < .00005, BF5 = .02), as were ratings of Conscious Intentions (M = -.88, 
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469 SD = 3.12, N = 198), t(197) = 3.98, p < .0005, BF = .009), and ratings of Conscious Control 
470 (M = -.84, SD = 3.04, N = 198), t(197) = 3.86, p < .0005, BF = .01). Thus, in the context of 
471 politics, average ratings of the Unconscious were significantly lower than Free Will, Conscious 
472 Intentions and Conscious Control. 
473
474 Ratings in Media Contexts: The mean ratings for each of the four dependent variables across 
475 the 2 different media scenarios (see Figure 2), revealed that, when comparing against ratings 
476 of the Unconscious, there were no significant differences to ratings of Free Will (M = .003, SD 
477 = 3.19, N = 198), t(197) = .01, p = .99, BF 17.72), ratings of Conscious Intentions (M = .25, 
478 SD = 3.10, N = 198), t(197) = 1.15, p = .25, BF = 9.24), and ratings of Conscious Control (M 
479 = .35, SD = 3.13, N = 198), t(191) = 1.57, p = .12, BF = 5.27). In the context of the media, 
480 average ratings of the Unconscious were not significantly different from Free Will, Conscious 
481 Intentions and Conscious Control. 
482
483 Experiment 2: Discussion
484 Overall, across all four countries the ratings people gave regarding the involvement of the 
485 Unconscious, Free Will, Conscious Intentions and Conscious Control in the 16 examples they 
486 were presented were similar. Correlational analyses revealed positive associations between 
487 ratings of Free Will, Conscious Intentions and Conscious Control, though ratings of the 
488 Unconscious were not associated with the other three ratings. While ratings of the unconscious 
489 did not significantly differ by context, looking at the five different contexts (Marketing, 
490 Research, Therapy, Politics, Media), for research and therapy the patterns suggested that 
491 ratings were higher for the involvement of the unconscious relative to ratings of free will, 
492 conscious intentions and conscious control. The opposite pattern was found in marketing and 
493 political contexts where ratings of the involvement of the unconscious were lower relative to 
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494 ratings of free will [marketing, political], conscious intentions [political] and conscious control 
495 [marketing, political]. Thus, while ratings of the involvement of the unconscious in behaviour 
496 was the same across contexts, ratings of free will, conscious intentions and conscious control 
497 did discriminate by context, in which they were either consistently higher (marketing, 
498 political), or lower (research, therapy) relative to the ratings of the involvement of the 
499 unconscious influences on behaviour. 
500
501 Experiment 3: Replication of Ratings tasks probing folk beliefs 
502 Given that the materials that were investigated in Experiment 2, the purpose of Experiment 3 
503 was to examined the replicability of the findings reported in Experiment 2. In all respects 
504 Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2, except that the sample tested were all from the 
505 UK (see Table 5), and 100 participants were recruited in total to take part. 
506
507 Results
508 Relationship between the four ratings: Consistent with the findings in Experiment 2, 
509 Experiment revealed a positive correlation between ratings of Free Will and ratings of 
510 Conscious Intentions r2(100) = .48 (moderate correlation), (β = .31), p < .00005, as well a 
511 positive correlation between ratings of Free Will and ratings of Conscious Control r2(100) = 
512 .49 (moderate correlation), (β = .29), p < .00005. Ratings of Conscious Intentions were also 
513 positively correlated with ratings of Conscious Control, r2(100) = .58 (high), (β = .48), p < 
514 .0000005. In addition, in line with the prediction tested in Experiment 2, there were weak 
515 negative relationships between ratings of the Unconscious and rating Conscious Control, 
516 r2(100) = .23 (low), (β = -.27), p < .05, and with ratings of Free Will, r2(100) = .19 (low), (β = 
517 -.15), p < .05.
518
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519 Differences in mean ratings by context: When comparing the 5 different contexts (Marketing, 
520 Research, Therapy, Political, Media) on ratings of the Unconscious, a repeated ANOVA 
521 revealed a significant main effect of context, F(1,99) = 4.03, p < .05, partial eta = .04. The same 
522 analysis performed on ratings of Free Will revealed a main effect of context, F(1,99) = 20.55, 
523 p < .00000001, partial eta = .17, as was the case with ratings of Conscious Intentions, F(1,99) 
524 = 13.10 p < .000001, partial eta = .12, and ratings of Conscious Control, F(1,99) = 5.11, p < 
525 .05, partial eta = .05. To examine these patterns more closely the remaining analysis considers 
526 each of the ratings in each context individually. 
527
528 Ratings in Marketing Contexts: The analyses revealed that when compared against ratings of 
529 the Unconscious, ratings of Free Will were not significantly different (M = .31 = 2.95, N = 
530 100), t(99) = 1.06, p =.29,  BF = 7.3), as were ratings of Conscious Control (M = .24, SD = 
531 2.60, N = 100), t(99) = .94, p = .35, BF = 8.19), and ratings of Conscious Intentions (M = .29, 
532 SD = 3.03, N = 100), t(99) = 1.00, p = .34, BF = 7.97). Thus, in the context of marketing, 
533 average ratings of the Unconscious were not significantly different from Free Will, Conscious 
534 Intentions and Conscious Control. 
535
536 Ratings in Research Contexts: When it came to the overall mean ratings under the context 
537 “Research” (see Figure 2), the analyses revealed that when compared against ratings of the 
538 Unconscious, ratings of Free Will were significantly lower (M = 2.35, SD = 2.90, N = 100), 
539 t(99) = 8.11, p < .000005, BF10 = 1.80), as were ratings of Conscious Intentions (M = 1.89, SD 
540 = 2.94, N = 100), t(99) = 6.44, p < .000005, BF7 = 4.56), and ratings of Conscious Control (M 
541 = 2.31, SD = 3.12, N = 100), t(99) = 7.40, p < .000005, BF9 = 5.33). Overall, consistent with 
542 Experiment 2, Experiment 3 revealed that for research, average ratings of the Unconscious 
543 were higher than Free Will, Conscious Intentions, and Conscious Control. 
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544
545 Ratings in Therapy Contexts: The overall mean ratings for each of the four dependent variables 
546 were analysed (see Figure 2). Comparing against ratings of the Unconscious, ratings of Free 
547 Will were significantly lower (M = 2.86, SD = 4.33, N = 100), t(99) = 6.59, p < .00005, BF7 = 
548 2.30), as were ratings of Conscious Intentions (M = 2.30, SD = 4.11, N = 100), t(197) = 5.59, 
549 p < .000005, BF = .00001), and ratings of Conscious Control (M = 2.92, SD = 4.28, N = 198), 
550 t(197) = 6.81, p < .00005, BF8 = 8.23). Thus, consistent with Experiment 2, Experiment 3 
551 revealed that in the context of therapy, average ratings of the Unconscious were significantly 
552 higher than Free Will, Conscious Intentions and Conscious Control. 
553
554 Ratings in Political Contexts: The mean ratings for each of the four dependent variables across 
555 the 2 different political examples were analysed (see Figure 2). Comparing against ratings of 
556 the Unconscious, ratings of Free Will were not significantly higher (M = -.52, SD = 3.70, N = 
557 100), t(99) = 1.40, p = .16, BF = 4.81), and nor were ratings of Conscious Control (M = -.58, 
558 SD = 3.28, N = 100), t(99) = 1.75, p = .08, BF = 2.83), but Ratings of Conscious Intentions 
559 were (M = 1.06, SD = 3.34, N = 100), t(99) = 3.17, p < .0005, BF = .11), Thus, in political 
560 contexts, Experiment 3 partially replicated Experiment 2, indicating that average ratings of the 
561 Unconscious were significantly lower than Conscious Intentions.
562
563 Ratings in Media Contexts: The mean ratings for each of the four dependent variables across 
564 the 2 different media scenarios (see Figure 2), revealed that, when comparing against ratings 
565 of the Unconscious, there were no significant differences with Conscious Intentions (M = .51, 
566 SD = 3.41, N = 100), t(99) = 1.50, p = .13, BF 4.23). Ratings of the Unconscious were 
567 significantly higher than ratings of Free Will (M = .93, SD = 3.90, N = 100), t(99) = 2.37, p< 
568 .05, BF = .84), and ratings of Conscious Control (M = .82, SD = 3.40, N = 100), t(99) = 2.38, 
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569 p < .05, BF = .82). In the context of the media, average ratings of the Unconscious were 
570 significantly higher than Free Will, and Conscious Control. 
571
572 Regressions: Given that the same demographics questions were presented in Experiment 2 and 
573 3, regression analyses were conducted separately on each of the four main ratings 
574 (Unconscious, Free Will, Conscious Intentions, Conscious Control). Ratings of Unconscious 
575 were examined for associations with Experiment (Experiment 2, Experiment 3), age, gender, 
576 education, political affiliation, and religiosity. The result of the regression indicated the 6 
577 predictors explained .08% of the variance (R2 .03; F(7,286) = 1.34, p = .23). The predictors 
578 failed to explain a significant proportion of the variance for Ratings of Free Will, (R2 .02; 
579 F(7,286) = 2.04, p = .05), Ratings of Conscious Intentions (R2 .004; F(7,286) = .82, p = .57) 
580 and Ratings of Conscious Control (R2 .02; F(7,286) = .36, p = .93). 
581
582 Experiment 3: Discussion
583 Consistent with Experiment 2, overall, across all four countries the ratings people gave were 
584 similar. Correlational analyses replicated the same pattern as Experiment 2, suggested that 
585 there is a strong positive association between ratings of Free Will, Conscious Control and 
586 Conscious Intentions. In line with the prediction tested in Experiment 2, for which there was 
587 no evidential support, in Experiment 3 there was a weak negative relationship between ratings 
588 of the Unconscious and Conscious Control, as well as the Free will. Regression analyses based 
589 demographic and experimental factors failed to reveal any statistically reliable association 
590 between the predictors and the four main ratings. 
591
592 Experiment 2 partially replicated the pattern of findings reported in Experiment 2 with respect 
593 to relative comparisons of ratings of the Unconscious to the other ratings by context. Average 
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594 ratings of the involvement of the unconscious relative to ratings of free will, conscious 
595 intentions and conscious control were higher for Research and Therapy context, and also 
596 Media. In addition, there was a partial replication of the pattern found in political contexts, 
597 where ratings of the Unconscious were lower than Conscious Intentions. For Marketing there 
598 were as no difference between ratings, which failed to replicated the pattern found in 
599 Experiment 2. 
600
601 General Discussion
602 The aim of this study was twofold. The first was to investigate which, if any, popular contexts 
603 emerge from responses to an open question asking which context has psychological research 
604 on the unconscious been applied? The findings from Experiment 1 suggest that across four 
605 different countries, the frequency and range of examples were broadly similar, of which the 
606 most commonly generated was marketing; more men, and more people identifying as liberals 
607 in their political affiliation generated examples under this category. 
608
609 There may be many reasons for why marketing (which included sales, advertising, and 
610 marketing itself) as a context featured so commonly amongst volunteered responses. One 
611 reason is that advertising and marketing have often been associated with subliminal advertising 
612 (for a brief review see Osman, 2014, 2018), which in turn has a long historical association with 
613 unconscious manipulation (Sheehan, 2013). Also, some have speculated that the association 
614 between subliminal processing and advertising is well known and may even play into the 
615 public’s continuing suspicion about the uses of advertising (Broyles, 2006). Thus, marketing, 
616 more broadly as a category of methods that utilise psychological research on the unconscious, 
617 dating back to the 50’s (Packard, 1957), this context may be the foremost example available in 
618 people’s memory which is why it was the most frequently volunteered example.
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619  
620 Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 presented a subset of examples from Experiment 1 to 
621 participants. Again, across four different countries the pattern of ratings of the unconscious, 
622 free will, conscious intentions, and conscious control were similar. Using a natural set of 
623 examples, the present study was able to extent previous work (e.g., Deutschländer et al, 2017; 
624 Malle, 2004; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Stillman, et al, 2011) suggesting that higher ratings of 
625 unconscious influence on behaviour, are associated with lower ratings of free will, and 
626 conscious control and the formation of prior conscious intentions. 
627
628 More specifically, there was weak support for the prediction that was tested, there was a 
629 negative relationship between ratings of the unconscious, and free will (not supported), 
630 conscious intentions (Experiment 3) and conscious control (Experiment 3). Also, when 
631 examining the average ratings of the Unconscious relative to the other three by context, several 
632 patterns emerged. The three were either higher than ratings of the Unconscious in Marketing 
633 (Experiment 2) and Politics (Experiment 2, Experiment 3), or lower than ratings of the 
634 unconscious in Therapy (Experiment 2, Experiment 3), Research (Experiment 2, Experiment 
635 3), and Media (Experiment 3). This reveals a relative ranking of contexts with respect to the 
636 level of conscious control, intent, and free will is experienced, given the level of unconscious 
637 influence. While, Experiment 1 revealed that marketing is the most commonly volunteered 
638 example of applications of psychological research on the unconscious, the success of this 
639 technique to manipulate people without their knowing seems to be doubtful based on responses 
640 in Experiment 2 and 3. In both marketing and political contexts behaviours such as voting or 
641 purchasing products were judged to be under greater conscious control, made freely, and 
642 involve prior consciously formed intentions presumably because the techniques used in 
643 marketing and political contexts are judged to exert less influence on the unconscious as 
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644 compared to professional contexts such therapy and medical research. In the case of therapy, 
645 the examples were of hypnotherapy, and for research, the examples included demonstrations 
646 of placebo effects to playing messages while sleeping. When it comes to examples of this kind, 
647 public opinion (e.g., Gardener & Brown, 2013; Johnson, & Hauck, 1999; Yu, 2004) is very 
648 much in line with empirically demonstrations of the close associations these examples have to 
649 a lack of conscious control and free will (e.g., Baars, Ramsøy, & Laureys, 2003; Haggard et al, 
650 2004).
651
652 The findings from Experiment 2 and 3 provide compelling support for previous work that 
653 suggests a close relationship between the concepts of the unconscious and those associated 
654 with volition (free will, conscious control, prior conscious intentions). Moreover, Experiment 
655 2 and 3 was able to show that the relationship between the unconscious and volition is context 
656 dependent. That is, contexts in which techniques used to influence behaviour are seen to vary 
657 according to their ability to target the unconscious to manipulate behaviour in an intended 
658 direction (by the agent implementing the technique). This in turn has consequences for 
659 perceived levels of conscious control or agency over actions taken in those contexts. It might 
660 be the case that people actually do have accurate beliefs about the extent to which they can 
661 preserve conscious choice and free will over their actions in a variety of contexts, contrary to 
662 the many demonstrations of misconceptions they have about other areas of psychology 
663 (Bensley, & Lilienfeld, 2017). Alternatively, it might be the case that people are adamant in 
664 preserving the belief that they are consciously responsible for their actions in contexts that 
665 matter to them (e.g., exercising their voting rights, purchasing behaviours), but will loosen the 
666 reigns of responsibility in other contexts where they are more comfortable deferring to the 
667 professional (e.g., hypnotherapists, medical researchers). If this is the case, then further work 
668 is needed to establish the attributions about the intentions behind different kinds of agents (e.g., 
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669 advertisers, policy makers, therapists, journalists, social media marketeers). The reason being 
670 that the underlying intentions attributed to the agent may interact with the level of conscious 
671 control people are willing to relinquish, or want to maintain. Thus, work of this kind can help 
672 uncover whether the basis on which public beliefs about the influence on the unconscious vary 
673 according to the how much agency and control over the behaviour is valued (Osman, 2014).
674
675 Limitations and future considerations: The virtue of the present study was that the materials 
676 used were highly ecologically valid, however to keep things fairly open and easy for 
677 participants to respond, there was some imprecision that was lost in the way the instructions 
678 were presented, and the questions that were posed to participants. These needs to be highlighted 
679 given that this increased the ambiguity in several areas of the study regarding the way the 
680 “unconscious” could have been interpreted by participants on which they then generated their 
681 responses. 
682 For instance, the definition of unconscious presented to participants in Experiment 1 was very 
683 broad, and while that was deliberate as to not restrict the kinds of examples participants would 
684 volunteer, a follow-up study could easily compare the range of examples that participants 
685 would generate depending on the type of definition of the unconscious that was presented to 
686 them. For example, Deutschländer et al (2017) manipulated the dimensions regarding the type 
687 of action depending on the degree that it was a biologically necessary action (e.g., drinking 
688 water because one is dehydrated), and this had an impact, along with other factors, when 
689 gauging how free an action is. Also, Monroe and Malle (2010) manipulated the instruction they 
690 presented to participants regarding the underlying basis of behaviour as neurological or not, 
691 which in turn influenced the pattern of responses regarding judgments of free will of actions. 
692 Thus, by extension, it might be the case that participants would volunteer a different range of 
693 examples where they believe insights from psychological research have been applied to 
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694 manipulate the unconscious when the definition of the unconscious is framed from an 
695 exclusively neurological basis. Therefore, this is an important consideration regarding the 
696 interpretation of the present findings because the range of examples generated in Experiment 
697 1, on which materials were used to examine judgments on free will in Experiment 2 and 3 are 
698 bound to the wide definition of the unconscious presented to participants to begin with.  
699 The second issue is that in Experiment 2 and 3 participants were presented with one judgment 
700 probe (i.e. unconscious) that was open to a lot of interpretation, and the remaining three (i.e. 
701 free will, conscious control, conscious intentions) which, one might argue, are a little more 
702 prescriptive in their interpretation. Without independently ascertaining whether, for instance, 
703 participants take a dualist position or not on the unconscious, or other positions they take, there 
704 would be no way to ascertain their interpretation of, and therefore the kind of response they 
705 gave to the question “To what extent do you think that [reference to method of influence] 
706 influences [reference to behaviour unconsciously?”. Any future studies that are conducted 
707 would need to either include several other questions to determine the general position that 
708 participants take with regards to the unconscious, when surveying folk beliefs on the 
709 unconscious in specific instances, because clearly their position in turn impacts their beliefs on 
710 free will (e.g. Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross, 2014).
711 Another critical limiting factor is that the focus of the present study was on folk beliefs on the 
712 unconscious with a specific emphasis on the control of behaviour. However, as noted in the 
713 introduction consciousness also concerns attention as well as a control. Considerations of 
714 attentional aspects of consciousness invite a range of phenomena not commonly considered by 
715 participants in the present study (e.g., subliminal perception, creativity, pain perception, 
716 attentional biases). Therefore, a natural extension of the present study would be to investigate 
717 the complement to control by framing the study on examining folk beliefs on consciousness 
718 with respect to attentional factors. 
Overstepping the boundaries of free choice
31
719 Finally, the sample of participants in Experiment 1 were asked to volunteer examples of 
720 situations for which they believed that had experienced day to day situation of the application 
721 of psychological research on the unconscious control of behaviours. There is of course no way 
722 to determine from the current study whether participants sampled in Experiment 2 and 3 had 
723 the same experiences as those that were generated by those in Experiment 1. Those in 
724 Experiment 2 and 3 were presented with a revised set of examples, with some minor edits, from 
725 which they were asked to make several judgments, for which the regression analyses revealed 
726 that age, gender, education, political affiliation and religiosity did not significantly predict 
727 variance in responses. However, in addition to this, in retrospect an additional measurement 
728 probe that could have been included in these experiments was one that asked the extent to 
729 which participants had direct experience with the scenarios that they were presented. This way 
730 it would be possible to assess the extent to which direct experience with the scenarios impacted 
731 the judgments but also to determine the extent to which the samples in Experiment 2 and 3 
732 were similar in their general folk beliefs to those sample in Experiment 1. A future replication 
733 and extension of this study that included a question of the kind proposed here would help to 
734 address this potential issue. 
735 General Conclusions
736 The present study sought to answer, by using an ecologically valid approach, three questions 
737 to which we did not previously have the answer to. The first being: Do people share similar 
738 beliefs regarding the examples of applications of psychological research on the unconscious 
739 control of behaviours? The findings from Experiment 1 suggest that, when comparing samples 
740 drawn from four different countries (Australia, Canada, UK, US) there is general convergence 
741 in the types of examples people freely volunteer. The second question being: Which are the 
742 most common examples? The findings from Experiment 1 reveal that the most frequently 
743 generated examples fall under the category Marketing (which includes advertising). The third 
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744 being: If unconscious control of behaviours is perceived to be used to influence behaviours in 
745 the real world, what type of folk beliefs are there regarding the extent to which conscious 
746 choice and free-will are maintained? The findings from Experiment 2 and 3 reveal that people 
747 have a nuanced assessment of the maintenance of free will, and relatedly, conscious control, 
748 and conscious intentions in different contexts for which psychological research on unconscious 
749 manipulations of behaviour is suspected to be applied (e.g., marketing, politics, therapy, 
750 media). Relative to rating the influence of the unconscious on behaviours in these contexts, if 
751 ratings of the unconscious are low, then correspondingly, ratings of free will, conscious control, 
752 and conscious intentions can often be higher (e.g. Context: Politics, Experiment 2 and 3), and 
753 vice versa, where rating of the unconscious are high, then ratings of free will, conscious control 









761 Åvitsland, A., Solbraa, A. K., & Riiser, A. (2017). Promoting workplace stair climbing: 
762 sometimes, not interfering is the best. Archives of public health, 75(1), 2.
763 Baars, B. J., Ramsøy, T. Z., & Laureys, S. (2003). Brain, conscious experience and the 
764 observing self. Trends in neurosciences, 26(12), 671-675.
765 Bargh, J. A. (2002). Losing consciousness: Automatic influences on consumer judgment, 
766 behaviour, and motivation. Journal of consumer research, 29(2), 280-285.
767 Bensley, D. A., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2017). Psychological misconceptions: Recent scientific 
768 advances and unresolved issues. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(4), 
769 377-382.
770 Benartzi, S., Beshears, J., Milkman, K. L., Sunstein, C. R., Thaler, R. H., Shankar, M., … 
771 Galing, S. (2017). Should governments invest more in nudging? Psychological 
772 science, 28(8), 1041–1055.
773 Broyles, S. J. (2006). Subliminal advertising and the perpetual popularity of playing to 
774 people’s paranoia. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 40(2), 392-406.
775 Deutschländer, R., Pauen, M., & Haynes, J. D. (2017). Probing folk-psychology: Do Libet-
776 style experiments reflect folk intuitions about free action?. Consciousness and 
777 cognition, 48, 232-245.
778 Dijksterhuis, A., Smith, P. K., Van Baaren, R. B., & Wigboldus, D. H. (2005). The 
779 unconscious consumer: Effects of environment on consumer behaviour. Journal of 
780 consumer psychology, 15(3), 193-202.
781 Feltz, A. (2015). Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will 
782 intuitions. Consciousness and cognition, 36, 113-130.
Overstepping the boundaries of free choice
34
783 Forstmann, M., & Burgmer, P. (2018). A free will needs a free mind: Belief in substance 
784 dualism and reductive physicalism differentially predict belief in free will and 
785 determinism. Consciousness and cognition, 63, 280-293.
786 Gardner, R. M., & Brown, D. L. (2013). A test of contemporary misconceptions in 
787 psychology. Learning and Individual Differences, 24, 211-215.
788 Gangopadhyay, N., Madary, M., & Spicer, F. (Eds.). (2010). Perception, action, and 
789 consciousness: Sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. Oxford University 
790 Press, UK.
791 Haggard, P., Cartledge, P., Dafydd, M., & Oakley, D. A. (2004). Anomalous control: when 
792 ‘free-will’is not conscious. Consciousness and cognition, 13(3), 646-654.
793 Johnson, M. E., & Hauck, C. (1999). Beliefs and opinions about hypnosis held by the general 
794 public: A systematic evaluation. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 42(1), 10-20.
795 Kerr, J., Eves, F., & Carroll, D. (2001). Can posters prompt stair use in a worksite environment? 
796 Journal of Occupational Health, 43(4), 205–207.
797 Kihlstrom, J. F. (2009). Unconscious cognition. Encyclopedia of Consciousness, 411-421.
798 Lin, Y., Osman, M., Ashcroft, R. (2017). Nudge: Concept, Effectiveness, and Ethics. Basic 
799 and Applied Social Psychology, 39, 293-306.
800 Lin, Y., Osman, M., Harris, A, & Read, D., (2018). Underlying Wishes and Nudged Choices. 
801 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied.
802 Malle, B.F. 2004. How the mind explains behaviour: Folk explanations, meaning, and social 
803 interaction. Cambridge: MIT
804 Malle, B.F., and J. Knobe. 1997. The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental 
805 Social Psychology 33: 101–121.
806 Marshall, A. L, Bauman, A. E., Patch, C., Wilson, J., & Chen, J. (2002). Can motivational signs 
807 prompt increases in incidental physical activity in an Australian health-care facility? 
Overstepping the boundaries of free choice
35
808 Health Education Research, 17, 743–749.
809 Martin, N., & Morich, K. (2011). Unconscious mental processes in consumer choice: Toward 
810 a new model of consumer behaviour. Journal of Brand Management, 18(7), 483-505.
811 Melnikoff, D. E., & Bargh, J. A. (2018). The mythical number two. Trends in cognitive 
812 sciences, 22(4), 280-293.
813 Monroe, A. E., & Malle, B. F. (2010). From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to 
814 study, not speculate about people’s folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy 
815 and Psychology, 1(2), 211-224.
816 Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., & Ross, L. T. (2014). The free will 
817 inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility. Consciousness and 
818 cognition, 25, 27-41.
819 Newell, B. R., & Shanks, D. R. (2014). Unconscious influences on decision making: A 
820 critical review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37(1), 1-19.
821 Osman, M. (2010). Controlling Uncertainty: A Review of Human Behaviour in Complex 
822 Dynamic Environments. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 65-86.
823 Osman, M. (2014). Future-minded: The psychology of Agency and Control. Palgrave-
824 MacMillan
825 Osman, M (2018). Persistent Maladies: The case of two-mind syndrome. Trends in Cognitive 
826 Science.
827 Osman, M., Lin, Y., Ashcroft, R. (2017). Nudge: A lesson in the theatrics of choice. Basic 
828 and Applied Social Psychology, 39, 311-316.
829 Packard, V. (1957). The Hidden Persuaders. New York: David McKay Company.
830 Pennartz, C. M. (2018). Consciousness, representation, action: the importance of being goal-
831 directed. Trends in cognitive sciences, 22(2), 137-153
832 Schmidt, A. T. (2017). The Power to Nudge. American Political Science Review, 111, 404–
Overstepping the boundaries of free choice
36
833 417.
834 Shea, N., & Frith, C. D. (2016). Dual-process theories and consciousness: the case for ‘Type 
835 Zero’cognition. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2016(1), 1-10.
836 Sheehan, K. B. (2013). Controversies in contemporary advertising. Sage Publications.
837 Shepherd, J. (2012). Free will and consciousness: Experimental studies. Consciousness and 
838 Cognition, 21(2), 915-927.
839 Stillman, T. F., Baumeister, R. F., & Mele, A. R. (2011). Free will in everyday life: 
840 Autobiographical accounts of free and unfree actions. Philosophical 
841 Psychology, 24(3), 381-394.
842 Sunstein, C. R. 2017. Nudges That Fail. Behavioural Public Policy,1, 4–25.
843 Thaler, R., & Sunstein., C. (2008). Nudge. The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism. New 
844 Haven: Yale University Press.
845 Vonasch, A. J., Baumeister, R. F., & Mele, A. R. (2018). Ordinary people think free will is a 
846 lack of constraint, not the presence of a soul. Consciousness and cognition, 60, 133-
847 151.
848 Yoo, S. C., Peña, J. F., & Drumwright, M. E. (2015). Virtual shopping and unconscious 
849 persuasion: The priming effects of avatar age and consumers’ age discrimination on 
850 purchasing and prosocial behaviours. Computers in Human Behaviour, 48, 62-71.
851 Yu, C. K. C. (2004). Beliefs and attitudes of Chinese regarding hypnosis and its 
852 applications. Contemporary Hypnosis, 21(3), 93-106.
853
854
Figure 1. Mean ratings (SE +/- 1) of the Unconscious, Free Will, Conscious Intentions and 
Conscious Control by Experiment 2 and 3
Figure 2. Mean ratings (SE +/- 1) of the Unconscious, Free Will, Conscious Intentions and 
Conscious Control for each of the 5 contexts presented to participants, by Experiment. 
Table 1. Participants profile from Experiment 1
Sample US UK Canada Australia
Total 
participants




N = 100 (all UK 
residents, UK nationals, 
first language English)








Females  29 (29%) 66 (66%) 32 (31%) 36 (37.5%)
Males 70 (71%) 32 (32%) 71 (68%) 59 (61.5%)
Prefer not to 
say
0 2 (2%) 1 (%) 1 (1%)
Age Mean 30.54 (SD = 
10.88) ranging from 
18-68
Mean 33.32 (SD = 
11.13) ranging from 
19-80
Mean 29.49 (SD = 
9.30) ranging from 18-
61
Mean 29.53 (SD = 




52.1% qualified with 




with Prefer not to 
say/other.
47.5% qualified with a 
degree (at bachelor 
degree and 
postgraduate level), 
52.5% responded with 
Prefer not to say/other.
59.8% qualified with a 
degree (at bachelor 
degree and 
postgraduate level) 
40.2% responded with 
Prefer not to say/other.
60.4% qualified with a 
degree (at bachelor 
degree and 
postgraduate level), 
39.6 %responded with 
Prefer not to say/other.
Political 
affiliation
57.5% identifying as 
liberal, 22.3% as 
centre, 14.9% as 
conservative, and 
4.3%% as prefer not 
to say/unsure/other
49.5% identifying as 
liberal, 23.2% as 
centre, 13.2% as 
conservative, and 
14.1% as prefer not to 
say/unsure/other
55.9% identifying as 
liberal, 20.6% as 
centre, 9.8% as 
conservative, and 13.7 
% as prefer not to 
say/unsure/other
54.2% identifying as 
liberal, 12.5% as 
centre, 11.5% as 
conservative, and 21.9 
as prefer not to 
say/unsure/other
Table 2. Categories generated by each of the three coders
Categories Coder 1 Coder 2 Coder 3
1 Advertising Advertising Advertising
2 Marketing Consumer 
choices/Marketing
Sales/Retail
3 Research Scientific studies Shopping
4 Therapy Psychology Psychological research
5 Hypnosis Hypnosis Casinos
6 Social Media Hypnotherapy Psychotherapy
7 Media (TV, FILM) Clinical Hypnosis
8 Political Social Media Hypnotherapy
9 Voting Government Media
10 Nudging Elections
11 Police Religion
Table 3. The proportion of responses in which there was disagreement between at least two 
coders.










Table 4. The proportion of responses by country and gender.








Marketing 45.1 42.4 44 43.3 51 44.2 45.7 50
Research 18.0 20.2 10 21.2 20.8 17.2 19.0
Therapy 4.3 6.1 6 1.9 3.1 4.9 3.9
Media 4.8 2.0 9 3.8 4.2 6.1 3.9
Political 6.3 7.1 6 5.8 6.3 7.4 5.6
Other 18.3 20.2 19 22.1 11.5 17.2 18.5 50
No 1.3 0 3 0 0 1.8 .9
Don’t know 2.0 2 3 1.9 3.1 1.2 2.6
Table 5. Participants profile from Experiment 2 and 3
Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Sample US UK Canada Australia UK
Total 
participants






















Females  24 (50%) 35 (67%) 21 (43%) 21 (43%) 69 (69%)
Males 22 (46%) 17 (33%) 28 (57%) 28 (57%) 31 (31%)
Prefer not 
to say
2 (4%) 0 0 0 0
Age Mean 31.81 (SD = 
10.02) ranging from 
18-59
Mean 33.03 (SD = 
9.12) ranging from 
18-61
Mean 30.65 (SD = 
98.45) ranging from 
18-56
Mean 28.50 (SD = 
7.54) ranging from 
18-50
Mean 36.28 (SD = 




33.3% qualified with 
a degree (at bachelor 
degree and 
postgraduate level), 
47.9% college level, 
18.8% prefer not to 
say/other
44.2% qualified with a 
degree (at bachelor 
degree and 
postgraduate level), 
40.4% college level, 
8% prefer not to 
say/other
63.3% qualified with 
a degree (at bachelor 
degree and 
postgraduate level), 
22.4% college level, 
14.3% prefer not to 
say/other
67.3% qualified 
with a degree (at 
bachelor degree and 
postgraduate level), 
18.4% college 
level, 14.3% prefer 
not to say/other
58% qualified with a 
degree (at bachelor 
degree and 
postgraduate level), 
29% college level, 




37.5% identifying as 
liberal, 31.3% as 
centre, 14.6% as 
conservative, and 
16.7% as prefer not 
to say/unsure/other
30.8% identifying as 
liberal, 17.3% as 
centre, 7.7% as 
conservative, and 
44.2%  as prefer not to 
say/unsure/other
34.7% identifying as 
liberal, 16.3% as 
centre, 8.2% as 
conservative, and 
40.8 %  as prefer not 
to say/unsure/other
38.8% identifying 
as liberal, 14.3% as 
centre, 6.1% as 
conservative, and 
40.8 %  as prefer 
not to 
say/unsure/other
40% identifying as 
liberal, 0% as centre, 
9% as conservative, 
and 51%  as prefer 
not to 
say/unsure/other
Religosity 47.9% identifying as 
having a religion, 
35.4% identifying as 
having no religion, 
16.7% prefer not to 
say/other
55.8% identifying as 
having a religion, 
19.2% identifying as 
having no religion, 
25% prefer not to 
say/other
49% identifying as 
having a religion, 
34.7% identifying as 
having no religion, 
16.3% prefer not to 
say/other
46.9% identifying 
as having a religion, 
38.8% identifying 
as having no 
religion, 14.3% 
prefer not to 
say/other
45% identifying as 
having a religion, 
36% identifying as 
having no religion, 
19% prefer not to 
say/other
1
Table 6. Final selection of descriptions generated by participants in Experiment 1, and the 
modified versions used in Experiment 2. 
Domain Original Description from Exp 1. Modified Description For Exp 2.
1. 1Marketing Advertisement jingles have been researched 
and implemented with the intention of having 
people unconsciously think of the product or 
service when they hear it and want to use that 
service or buy that product mentioned.
Advertisement jingles that are used so that 
people think of the product or service when 
they hear the jingle and then buy that service or 
buy the product.
2. Subliminal messaging, such as seeing how 
the exposure of a product can leave an 
impression on someone for an extended 
amount of time, no matter how small the 
impression.
Subliminal adverts (messaged flashed so 
quickly that they are not aware of seeing them) 
that presents a product so that it stays in 
people's mind and they then go and buy the 
product. 
3. Advertisers utilize psychological research in 
order to maximize their chance of selling to 
you, like 'Buy two get one free' sales where 
the buyer thinks they are getting a great deal.
Advertisers that increase their chance of selling 
to people when using ‘buy two get one free’ 
sales on products so that people think that they 
are getting a great deal.
4. When purchasing things at a supermarket, 
psychological research has shown eye level is 
good, and end of row displays are more eye 
catching, thus manipulating people into 
purchasing particular things.
Supermarkets that present goods at eye level 
and at the end of row displays so that they are 
more eye catching to people to influence their 
purchasing of particular products.
5. Dealership or other areas where a sales 
person or someone is trying to steer a person 
to making the decision they want, the way 
certain questions are posed and actions are 
taken are deliberately taken to steer the 
person to spend more money and make more 
for the dealership
Car Dealerships that employ staff to steer 
people by the way that they pose certain 
questions so that people spend more money.
6. Research In research when showing someone a picture 
of something before a study so it is in their 
minds, then having them pick between it and 
something else during the study.
Research that involves showing people a 
picture of something before a study so that it is 
in their minds, in order to study the influences 
on their choice when asked to select between 
the same picture and another picture.
7. Studies involving people sleeping. When 
they are asleep they have had messages 
played to them and they may influence their 
unconscious mind.
Research studying people sleeping that 
involves playing messages to them while they 
are asleep to examine the influence on their 
mind.
8. Giving them sugar cubes and pretending that 
they're pills, and the pills having an affect on 
them due to their mental belief.
Research that involves giving people sugar 
cubes posing as pills to study the influence on 
peoples mental belief that the pills will have an 
effect on them.
9. Flashing a positive or negative stimulus so 
quickly that the person does not consciously 
see it before another stimulus will affect that 
person's attitude towards the second stimulus.
Research that flashes up positive or negative 
information so quickly that people are not 
aware of seeing it, and then studying how this 
will effect peoples’ attitudes towards the 
quickly flashed up information.
10. Examining implicit bias and how it forms. 
For instance, causing negative or positive 
associations towards a neutral stimulus and 
seeing if it affects people's perception of it.
Research that examines biases by creating 
either positive or negative links with a neural 
piece of information, and then studying how it 




Hypnosis techniques work on people while 
they are unconscious and then it is possible to 
manipulate their choices more easily while 
Hypnotic methods that are used on people 
while they are in a relaxed state so that it is 
possible to influence their choices while they 
2
under that state. are under that state.
12. Hypnosis is one of the ways we can uncover 
hidden secrets of the unconscious mind and 
then begin to heal from past traumas.
Hypnotic methods that are used on people to 
uncover hidden memories so that it is possible 
to heal them from past traumas.
13. political Research on the unconscious has been used to 
present political party leaders in a certain way 
to sway the public's vote choice, such as how 
they dress and speak.
Political campaigning that helps political party 
leaders to dress and speak in a certain way so 
that it is possible to influence people’s voting 
choice.
14. It has been used to target ads to specific 
groups of people so that they lean towards 
one political candidate (Manipulating the 
voters into leaning towards some candidate)
Political campaigning that uses political 
advertisements targeted towards specific 
groups of people in such a way as to influence 
them towards one political candidate over 
another.
15. media Social Media through targeted advertising 
that can be used to manipulate people's 
opinions
Social Media that use advertisements targeted 
towards specific groups of people in such a way 
as to influence their opinions.
16. Social media is an example. The experience 
has been tailored to influence the 
unconscious minds of users.
Social Media that is designed in such a way so 
that the people using the social media 
experience it in such a way that it influences the 
way that they think. 
Title: Overstepping the boundaries of free choice: Folk beliefs on free will and determinism 
in real world contexts
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